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This symposium takes on the broad and important topic of prosecutorial
discretion. Prosecutors in the United States wield enormous discretion at every
stage of the criminal justice process, from the initial decision whether to bring
charges to the decisions that conclude a case, including those relating to plea
negotiations and sentencing.
This discretion is subject to relatively few checks. The present system
operates in a fashion that is a far cry from the traditional adversarial trial-focused
model, in which the defense challenges the prosecution's case in adversarial
proceedings that culminate in a jury trial. Because only a tiny fraction of cases
now go to trial, the traditional trial-related adversarial checks are absent in most
cases.
Four of the articles in this symposium explore the effectiveness of various
mechanisms intended to improve the performance of prosecutors and to hold them
accountable. Two of the articles focus on the process of selecting prosecutors.
Most states elect prosecutors, and Ronald Wright evaluates the effectiveness of this
system of political accountability, drawing on new data measuring the electoral
success of incumbent prosecutors as well as press accounts of the typical rhetoric
in prosecutor election campaigns. In the federal system, U.S. Attorneys are
appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, and Sara
Beale uses the Bush Administration's firing of the U.S. Attorneys as the occasion
for considering whether this system increases the likelihood that partisan politics
will unduly influence federal prosecutions and should be replaced by a civil service
merit appointment system. Two other articles consider structural or doctrinal
changes that would alter incentives for prosecutors. Darryl Brown explores the
political dynamics that promote legislative overcriminalization and give
prosecutors excessive leverage, and he proposes a doctrinal solution, the revival of
the merger doctrine, as one mechanism to respond to these problems. Stephanos
Bibas, who characterizes prosecutorial discretion as a principal-agent problem,
proposes compensation and rewards as a means to align prosecutors' incentives
with the interests of voters, victims, and defendants.
The final two articles propose the creation of new ethical and professional
duties to address the chronic problem of the wrongful conviction of factually
innocent defendants. Robert Mosteller focuses on cases involving defendants who
are innocent of the crime charged, but who have some past or present involvement
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in crime, and who stand accused only by informants whose testimony has been
secured by the prosecutor's powerful promises of freedom in exchange for their
incriminating testimony. Bruce Green and Ellen Yaroshefsky take up the question
how prosecutors should exercise discretion when, after criminal proceedings have
ended, new information casts doubt on a convicted defendant's guilt.
